Why Do We Expect Businesses to Make Money Immediately?

From Anthropic's multibillion-dollar losses to the future of e-commerce: why building long-term value requires a different approach to investment.

$80.7 billion in losses, and investors are still paying attention

On 20 October 2026, The Wall Street Journal reported something that would make almost any traditional business investor uncomfortable.

Anthropic, the company behind Claude and one of the world's leading artificial intelligence businesses, disclosed a net loss of $80.7 billion for the first six months of 2026 in a draft prospectus. Revenue for the same six months was $16.3 billion.

Yes, billion.

Before anyone jumps to conclusions, there is an important financial detail. Roughly $72 billion of that loss comes from revaluing convertible notes and other financing instruments, not from money spent running the business. When the company's valuation rises, the value of those instruments rises with it, and the increase is booked as a loss.

This distinction matters enormously.

The cash side is still large. Spending on computing power and infrastructure was close to $9 billion in the first half alone, more than the $7.3 billion spent across the whole of 2025. Anthropic is making substantial commitments to infrastructure, research and talent, and investors must weigh considerable uncertainty about future profitability.

What interests me most, however, is not the headline number.

It is the difference between how certain investors evaluate a business's future and how investment opportunities are often evaluated in our region.

Imagine approaching an investor in Lebanon with the following proposition:

"I want to build a technology company. We will need significant capital. We might not become profitable for the first three to five years. We will reinvest what we earn into technology, hiring, customer acquisition and expansion. There is a possibility we lose everything, but if we execute properly, the opportunity could become much larger than the Lebanese market."

For many investors, that conversation would end very quickly.

Now imagine walking into the same meeting with a different proposal.

"I want to open a restaurant. I found a beautiful location, we have an attractive concept, and we expect to start generating sales from our first month."

Suddenly, the conversation becomes more interesting.

There are familiar numbers to discuss: rent, decoration, kitchen equipment, seating capacity, average spending per customer.

The restaurant feels real. The technology company feels uncertain.

But here is the uncomfortable question:

Since when did a business become a better investment simply because customers can start paying on opening day?

Generating sales is not the same as generating profit. Generating profit is not the same as recovering the original investment. And recovering the investment is not necessarily the same as creating a valuable, scalable business.

This is the distinction I want to explore.

1. The investment mentality we need to question

I have nothing against restaurants, cafes, or the food and beverage sector.

They create employment, contribute to the economy, and can generate excellent returns when managed properly. I have written separately about why so many of them fail in Lebanon, and the reasons are rarely about the food.

My concern is the tendency to confuse a familiar business with a financially attractive business.

Across parts of Lebanon and the GCC, investment decisions can be influenced by what people can see, understand, and discuss with confidence.

A restaurant has a location. A property has physical land. A shop has inventory. A franchise has an established name.

These investments feel tangible.

A technology business, on the other hand, might initially consist of software, customer data, a small team, intellectual property, and an idea that needs years of execution.

Its assets are less visible.

And sometimes, less visible means less convincing.

I have also observed another problem: the expectation that capital should immediately produce income.

Someone has $100,000 available and wants to invest it. They naturally ask, "How much will I earn per month?"

It is a reasonable question for an income-producing investment.

But it is not always the right first question for an early-stage growth business.

The better questions may be:

• How large is the opportunity?
• What will the initial investment help the company achieve?
• What evidence supports customer demand?
• How much additional funding might be required?
• What milestones could increase the company's value?
• What is the realistic route to profitability or an eventual exit?

We should not treat every investment as if we are purchasing an apartment to collect rent.

Different assets have different economic structures, time horizons, and risks.

And one of the biggest mistakes an investor can make is using the same expectations for all of them.

2. How investing in a growth company actually works

Let me explain the mechanism, because I believe this is where much of the misunderstanding begins.

When someone invests in a young business in exchange for equity, they generally purchase a percentage of ownership.

They are not necessarily lending money that must be repaid with monthly interest. Nor are they guaranteed monthly dividends.

They become an owner, sharing in the company's potential upside and downside.

Imagine an entrepreneur builds an e-commerce technology business valued at $400,000 before investment.

An investor provides $100,000 in new equity financing.

The resulting post-investment valuation is $500,000, giving that investor 20% ownership, assuming a straightforward transaction with no other adjustments.

What happens next?

The company uses that $100,000 to develop its product, acquire customers, recruit people, or enter new markets.

It may generate sales immediately. But those sales might be reinvested rather than distributed to shareholders.

The investor's return could eventually come through dividends, a sale of their shares, an acquisition, or another liquidity event.

For example, if that 20% stake is later sold for $600,000, the investor makes a substantial gain relative to the original $100,000 investment.

But the opposite is equally possible.

The company might fail. It might require another funding round that dilutes existing shareholders. The investor might struggle to find a buyer for their shares even if the company grows.

A higher valuation on paper is not the same as money returned to an investor's bank account.

And that is precisely why investing in growth companies requires more than enthusiasm.

It requires financial discipline, patience, risk assessment, and an understanding of how future value might eventually become a real financial return.

3. How many years before investors actually make money?

There is no universal timeline.

The expected holding period depends on the type of business, the financing structure, the market, and the investor's objectives.

A profitable family-owned distributor can produce cash for shareholders relatively early.

A venture-backed software company might reinvest its revenue for years and never pay dividends.

A physical retail concept may have operating profits but take several years to recover its initial investment.

To make the differences easier to understand, consider the following illustrative planning horizons:

These are not guaranteed timelines or universal industry averages. They are examples of why investment planning must reflect the particular business model.

A restaurant may never recover its initial capital. A technology company may achieve profitability quickly. An e-commerce operation may become cash-flow-positive much earlier than expected.

The principle is that time to revenue, time to profitability, time to investment payback, and time to an investor's exit are four different measures.

We often discuss them as if they mean the same thing.

They do not.

Consider a business that costs $200,000 to establish and eventually generates $40,000 annually in distributable cash.

Ignoring financing costs, taxes, changes in working capital, and the time value of money, the simple payback would take five years once that annual cash generation begins.

Now compare it with a startup that does not distribute cash but grows in value over seven years and is eventually acquired.

Both investments could generate returns through very different mechanisms.

A competent investor should understand which mechanism they are funding before committing capital.

4. Why do investors finance companies that are losing money?

This is where Anthropic becomes an interesting example.

Many people assume that if a company reports losses, it must be performing badly.

But a reported loss can reflect several different realities.

It may indicate that operating costs exceed revenue. It may include non-cash accounting charges. It may result partly from deliberate spending on research and market expansion. Or it may reflect a business whose economics are fundamentally unsustainable.

Those situations should not be treated equally.

In Anthropic's case, the extraordinary headline loss is largely a function of financing-related accounting. The $80.7 billion figure should not be described as six months of cash burned. The company's genuine spending on computing and infrastructure, close to $9 billion in the half, is substantial but it is an order of magnitude smaller than the headline.

Investors therefore need to examine the operating business separately from the accounting headline.

And they need to read the rest of the filing. The same reporting notes that about a fifth of Anthropic's revenue came from two customers. That is a concentration risk, and it is exactly the kind of detail a serious investor weighs against a headline growth number. Revenue of $16.3 billion in six months is remarkable. Revenue of $16.3 billion where one or two relationships could move a fifth of it is a different proposition.

Why might an investor still be interested?

Because they may believe the company is developing valuable technology, capturing demand in a rapidly expanding market, and building products that could generate significant future cash flows.

That belief, however, is not proof that the valuation is justified.

The company faces competitive pressure, infrastructure obligations, technological uncertainty, and the possibility that future profitability will disappoint.

This is the part we should learn from.

Long-term investors do not simply ignore losses. They ask whether today's spending is creating tomorrow's economic value.

There is a fundamental difference between a company losing money because it is building something with attractive future economics and a company losing money because it cannot sell its product profitably.

The former may justify additional investment under the right assumptions.

The latter may need to change its business model before receiving another dollar.

And no amount of storytelling can replace that analysis.

5. The problem with our obsession with immediate sales

Let us return to the restaurant example.

Suppose someone invests $250,000 to open a new food and beverage concept.

The launch receives attention. Influencers visit. Customers take pictures. The restaurant is busy during its first several weeks.

Everyone is excited.

The owner proudly announces $60,000 in monthly sales.

But what does that number actually tell us?

Almost nothing about the return on the original investment.

We need to know food costs, payroll, rent, utilities, marketing, maintenance, taxes, delivery commissions, debt service, and ongoing replacement expenditures.

A restaurant can generate impressive revenue while producing very little cash for its owners.

It can also generate positive monthly operating cash flow while remaining far from recovering its original $250,000 investment.

Now suppose the investor starts receiving $3,000 monthly in genuinely distributable cash after all necessary expenses and reinvestment requirements.

At a constant rate, recovering $250,000 would take approximately 83 months, or almost seven years, before considering the time value of money.

The business is making money each month.

But the investor has not necessarily recovered the investment.

This is why I find the idea that food and beverage automatically offers quick returns so misleading.

A business should never be assessed purely by how quickly the first transaction happens.

The right assessment includes margins, cash flow, working capital, risk, competitive advantage, and capital recovery.

And those same principles apply to e-commerce.

6. E-commerce has an investment problem too

Working in e-commerce, I see a similar mentality repeatedly.

Someone wants to launch an online store.

They pay for a website, buy inventory, photograph products, and allocate a small advertising budget.

Then the questions begin.

"Why aren't we profitable yet?"

"We've been advertising for three weeks. Where is the return?"

"We spent $2,000 on marketing. Why haven't we recovered all our expenses?"

These questions are understandable. Nobody wants to waste money.

But they can reveal an important misunderstanding of how an e-commerce business grows.

An e-commerce store is not simply a website where products are displayed.

It is a commercial operation that requires investment across multiple functions:

Technology, merchandising, brand development, customer acquisition, conversion optimisation, logistics, inventory, customer service, data analysis, and retention.

The website is infrastructure.

It is not the entire business.

And just like a physical business, an e-commerce operation must be allowed enough time and capital to test whether its economics work.

That does not mean spending indefinitely without results.

It means establishing a disciplined investment period and judging the business against the appropriate milestones.

7. The economics of building an e-commerce brand

Imagine launching an online cosmetics brand in Lebanon.

The business sells a product for $40.

For illustration, assume its unit economics look like this:

Under these simplified assumptions, the first order contributes $8 toward fixed costs and profit.

If fixed operating costs are $4,000 per month, the business would need 500 such orders monthly to cover those costs, assuming the same economics apply throughout.

And that is before recovering startup spending.

Suddenly, we can understand why an e-commerce brand might generate orders from day one while needing considerably longer to reach sustainable profitability. If you want to run these numbers against your own product, the Lebanon e-commerce cost calculator models the same structure with your figures.

Now imagine that its customer acquisition costs fall as recognition grows.

Customers start returning. Email and WhatsApp retention efforts become more effective. Organic search begins producing qualified traffic. Product bundles increase order values.

If these improvements are real and measurable, the economics may improve.

The business is no longer relying exclusively on purchasing every new customer through paid advertising.

It has started building a commercial asset.

But repeat purchases should never be assumed. A product that customers buy only once, or a brand with poor retention, may never achieve the improvement described above.

This is exactly why investors must understand customer acquisition cost, contribution margin, repeat purchase behaviour, inventory turnover, and cash requirements.

A strong e-commerce business is not the one generating the most orders. It is the one that can turn those orders into sustainable economic value.

8. The first 24 months: what should an e-commerce investor expect?

I would encourage investors to look at the early life of an e-commerce brand in stages rather than demanding profitability from its first advertising campaign.

Months 1 to 3: validate the opportunity

At this stage, the objective is to establish whether customers want the product and whether the business can fulfil orders reliably.

The company should examine product demand, price sensitivity, conversion rates, advertising performance, customer feedback, and delivery success.

The investor should not automatically expect a profit.

But they should expect evidence.

If customers consistently reject the product, the business needs to act rather than blindly increase marketing expenditure.

Months 4 to 6: understand the economics

Now we should have better information about customer acquisition costs, contribution margins, returns, repeat purchases, and operational expenses.

The key question becomes whether the business has a realistic path to sustainable performance.

If acquisition costs are higher than the contribution customers are likely to generate, we have a problem.

More spending does not necessarily solve it.

Months 7 to 12: build repeatability

If the early results are promising, the business can improve its acquisition channels, develop retention systems, strengthen fulfilment, and increase conversion rates.

It may start approaching operating break-even or positive cash flow, depending on the product category and fixed-cost structure.

But the objective should remain disciplined, profitable growth rather than sales volume at any cost.

Months 13 to 24: decide whether to scale

At this stage, the investor should be able to evaluate the business using more meaningful data.

• Does the company have healthy margins?
• Can it acquire customers predictably?
• Do customers come back?
• Does inventory move efficiently?
• Can it expand without creating a working-capital crisis?

If the answers are positive, additional financing may make sense.

If they are negative, the right decision may be to restructure, remain small, or stop investing.

These are proposed management checkpoints, not promises that every brand should follow the same timetable.

Patient capital does not mean unlimited capital.

It means giving a business sufficient time to prove a credible model while maintaining financial accountability.

9. The hidden advantage of e-commerce: scaling beyond one location

One of the reasons I believe e-commerce deserves more serious investment attention in Lebanon is its potential to reach customers beyond a single physical location.

A traditional retail business often depends heavily on its immediate geography.

An e-commerce brand can potentially serve customers across cities and countries using digital distribution, provided it can solve the practical challenges of payments, logistics, customs, regulations, and customer service.

For a small market like Lebanon, that possibility matters.

An entrepreneur does not necessarily have to depend entirely on Lebanese consumer demand.

A well-positioned brand could explore GCC markets, serve diaspora communities, or expand into suitable international markets. I have argued this at length in why marketing cannot manufacture purchasing power: selling across borders is how a founder chooses which economy they depend on.

Of course, international expansion is not as simple as activating advertisements in another country.

Cross-border shipping, product compliance, taxes, payment methods, delivery costs, and local competition can make expansion difficult.

But the business architecture offers a different kind of opportunity.

A physical restaurant might require an entirely new lease, kitchen, team, and operating structure to open another branch.

An established e-commerce operation may be able to expand into another market using part of its existing technology and brand infrastructure, although additional investment and local adaptation will still be required.

That is an important difference in potential scalability.

And it changes how investors should think about value.

A business that serves a small group of local customers might eventually become a brand with demand across several markets.

Its value comes not only from current profits, but also from the defensibility and future cash-generating capacity of the business it has built.

10. What Shopify teaches us about building an e-commerce ecosystem

Consider Shopify.

In its full-year 2025 results, Shopify reported approximately $11.6 billion in revenue, up around 30% on 2024, and announced a $2 billion share buyback.

Its business operates through two major revenue categories: subscription solutions and merchant solutions.

This distinction is important.

Shopify is not merely selling website subscriptions.

Its platform also participates in the commercial activity of merchants through services such as payments, transactions, and other merchant tools.

As its merchant ecosystem develops, the company can generate revenue through several services rather than depending on a single subscription fee.

This is an example of what happens when a company thinks beyond its initial product.

It builds infrastructure that supports a larger commercial ecosystem.

For entrepreneurs in Lebanon and the GCC, the lesson is not that every startup can become Shopify.

Most will not.

The lesson is that an investor should understand the difference between financing a simple sales channel and financing a business model with opportunities for repeatable and scalable value creation.

A regional e-commerce opportunity could be a consumer brand, a specialised distribution platform, a logistics solution, merchant software, or a technology product that improves how online businesses operate.

These are different categories with different risk and return characteristics.

But they all deserve to be evaluated on their actual economics rather than dismissed because they do not generate immediate dividends.

11. Why the funding model matters as much as the business idea

Another issue I believe deserves more attention is how businesses are financed.

Not every entrepreneur should raise venture capital.

Not every investor should buy startup equity.

And not every good business needs to grow aggressively.

Sometimes, a profitable small company financed through founder savings or modest debt is more appropriate than a venture-backed startup.

But we need to understand the options.

Equity financing gives investors ownership in exchange for capital. Returns generally depend on dividends, share sales, or an exit.

Debt financing provides capital that the business must repay under agreed terms, usually including interest, regardless of whether the company succeeds.

Revenue-based financing may link repayments to a percentage of revenue, subject to the specific contract. This can suit some businesses with relatively predictable sales, but repayments can still strain cash flow.

Strategic investment can combine money with commercial benefits such as distribution access, expertise, supply relationships, or market entry.

For some e-commerce businesses, supplier credit or inventory financing may also be useful because stock purchasing is a major driver of cash requirements.

Each financing model carries different risks.

An entrepreneur should not promise fixed monthly returns on ordinary equity simply to make an investment sound more appealing.

Likewise, investors should not demand venture-scale upside while refusing to accept venture-scale risk.

The capital structure has to match the business model.

A company developing innovative software may need patient equity capital.

An established online distributor with stable demand may be better served by an inventory credit facility.

An early-stage direct-to-consumer brand might initially use founder funding and carefully staged financing until it proves its economics.

Financing should be a strategic decision, not simply a search for anyone willing to provide money.

12. What I would change about investment thinking in Lebanon and the GCC

I do not believe the answer is to stop investing in physical businesses.

Nor do I believe we should encourage everyone to finance AI startups because the sector currently attracts attention.

There are plenty of unsuccessful technology companies, and some businesses with impressive valuations eventually disappoint their investors.

We should also acknowledge that Lebanon and GCC countries have different financial conditions, investor ecosystems, regulations, and access to capital. The region cannot be treated as one uniform market.

My criticism is directed at a narrower mindset: judging investment opportunities primarily by their familiarity and how quickly they appear to generate cash.

I would like to see investors become more comfortable asking better questions.

Instead of demanding profit within three months, ask what the company must prove within those three months.

Instead of requesting guaranteed returns, ask how downside risk is being controlled.

Instead of assuming that a physical business is safer, compare cash flows, competitive pressures, and capital requirements.

Instead of treating every early loss as a failure, distinguish strategic reinvestment from a broken business model.

And instead of placing all available capital into one familiar opportunity, consider whether an appropriately diversified portfolio could include a limited allocation to higher-risk, longer-term businesses.

That last point is especially important.

Early-stage investments can be illiquid, highly speculative, and subject to total loss. They are not appropriate for money a household may need for ordinary expenses or emergencies.

Patient investing should never mean careless investing.

It should mean understanding the risks, the time horizon, the financial model, and the possible sources of future returns.

13. What entrepreneurs must do differently

Investors are not solely responsible for improving the region's investment culture.

Entrepreneurs also need to present their businesses more professionally.

A founder cannot simply walk into a meeting, describe an exciting future, and expect someone to finance five years of losses.

That is not a serious investment proposal.

If I were presenting an e-commerce business to investors, I would want to explain what market we are entering, why the product is competitive, and how much capital we need.

I would show a financial model that includes realistic acquisition costs, gross margins, operating costs, inventory requirements, cash burn, and working-capital assumptions.

I would also explain which milestones the investment should fund and what happens if those milestones are missed.

Most importantly, I would distinguish between my ambition and my evidence.

A forecast is not a fact.

A potential customer is not a paying customer.

A large market is not proof of demand for my particular product.

And a high return projected in a spreadsheet is not a guaranteed investor outcome.

If entrepreneurs want more sophisticated investors, they need to become more sophisticated in how they manage and explain their businesses.

Trust must be earned through transparency and execution.

14. The business we could build instead

Imagine what could happen if more capital in Lebanon and the GCC were allocated to well-researched digital businesses.

A regional consumer brand could develop its own product range and build repeat customers across several countries.

A software company could help merchants automate operations, manage inventory, or improve customer experience.

An e-commerce logistics company could solve recurring fulfilment problems across underserved markets.

A specialised marketplace could connect businesses to suppliers or customers more efficiently.

None of these ideas is automatically investable.

They require validation, capable teams, sound economics, and the ability to compete.

But they represent opportunities to build assets with economic value that may extend beyond a single physical location.

That is the kind of investment conversation I want to see more often.

Not simply, "How quickly can I get my money back?"

But, "What are we actually building, why should it become valuable, what will it cost, and what evidence will prove we are moving in the right direction?"

The second conversation is harder.

It requires financial literacy, market research, and a willingness to operate under uncertainty.

But it is also a conversation worth having if we genuinely want to build more innovative businesses.

Conclusion: we need investors who understand the difference between spending and building

Anthropic's financial disclosures are not proof that losses create value.

In fact, its extraordinary costs, its customer concentration, and its financial risks should remind every investor of the dangers of overpaying for future expectations.

But its story illustrates something worth discussing.

Some investors are willing to provide enormous amounts of capital to businesses whose financial potential may take years to materialise.

They are not necessarily expecting a monthly payment.

They are making a calculated, risky bet on future value.

In Lebanon and the GCC, I would like to see more conversations about that distinction.

Because there is nothing wrong with investing in a restaurant.

There is nothing wrong with wanting steady cash income.

And there is absolutely nothing wrong with rejecting an investment that is too risky.

The problem begins when immediate cash generation becomes our only definition of a good investment.

A thriving economy needs different types of capital: some financing stable businesses, some supporting expansion, and some willing to back carefully selected innovation.

For e-commerce entrepreneurs in particular, this means building businesses with financial discipline while communicating honestly about the time needed to develop them.

For investors, it means recognising that a strong brand, a scalable platform, a loyal customer base, and valuable technology can take time to build.

A business that does not distribute profits immediately is not automatically a bad investment.

And a business that generates sales immediately is not automatically a good one.

Maybe the question we should start asking is not how quickly an investment will return our money, but whether the business we are financing is capable of creating lasting value.

That, to me, is a much more interesting investment mentality.

Questions people are asking

Sources and further reading

• Anthropic revenue hits $16.3 billion as preliminary S-1 outlines IPO risks, reporting on The Wall Street Journal, 20 October 2026.
• Anthropic posts $80.7 billion first-half loss, largely from accounting charges, covering the net loss, the revenue figure and the customer concentration.
• Anthropic loss: $80 billion, but mostly on paper, for the split between the non-cash revaluation and actual infrastructure spending.
• Shopify full-year 2025 results, reported 11 February 2026: approximately $11.6 billion revenue, up around 30%.

The financial scenarios and timelines in this article are illustrative, not investment forecasts. Byblos Horizon is not a licensed investment adviser and nothing here is investment advice. Opinions about regional investment culture reflect the author's observations rather than a representative survey of investors.